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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE- KANAB FREIGHT 
LINES, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintvjf, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and HAL S. BE.NNETT, 
DONALD HACKING, and JESSER. 
S. BUDGE, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
and A. B. ROBINSON, doing business 
as A. B. ROBINSON TRUCK 
LINES, 
Defendants. 
No. 8941 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief is before the Supreme Court in support 
of a Pet:Ltion for Rehearing upon the decision of this 
Court filed May 13, 1959, affirming an order of the Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah, which granted to defend-
ant A. B. Robinson, dba A. B. Robinson Truck Line, con-
tract carrier permit No. 475. This reahearing is urged 
upon the court not in consideration of the economic ef-
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2 
fects as to Plaintiff of the of the Public Service Com-
mission which was affirmed by the decision of this Court, 
but rather because of the far-reaching and disasterous 
effect of the unprecedented legal theory announced in 
the decision. 
STATEMENT OF POINT AND ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE 
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION UPON 
THE UNPRECEDENTED LEGAL THEORY THAT CON-
TRA:CT CARRIER AUTHORITY WILL BE GRANTED IN A 
SITUATION WHERE SUCH GRANT WILL NOT DEPRIVE 
AUTHORIZED COMMON CARRIERS OF TRAF'FIC THEY 
ARE NOT AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION TRANS-
PORTING. SUCH A PROPOSITION IS CONTRARY TO THE 
LAW AND COMPLETELY ABANDONS THE .CONCEPT OF 
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AND ADE-
QUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES AS PREREQUISITES TO 
A GRANT OF AUTHORITY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 
5'4-6-s, u.e.A. 1953. 
In its opinion affirming the decision of the Public 
Service Commission, :the court said: 
"Here the evidence indicates that the grant-
ing of this contract carrier authority will not de-
prive the common carrier of any business, but 
the contract carrier will only haul freight which 
the contractees have in the past hauled in their 
own trucks and which they clain1 they will haul 
in the future if the contract carrier authority is 
not granted, because they claim they can haul this 
freight in their own trucks for less than the plain-
tiff com1non carrier rates." 
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The implications of this language extend far beyond 
the economic considerations involved in this case. In ef-
fect the court has abandoned the requirements of con-
venience and necessity and a showing of inadequacy of 
the service currently supplied by common carriers, which 
have long been established in the law of this 8tate. (See 
Wycoff Co. v. Public Servvce CommiJssion, 227 P. (2d) 
323 (1951); Rudy v. Public Service Commission, 265 P. 
(2d) 401 (1954) ; Goodrich v. Publvc Service Commiss~on, 
198 P.(2d) 975, (1948); McCarthy v. Public Service Com-
mission, 198 P. (2d) 220, (1947). All a contract carrier 
applicant need show under the decision of this Court is 
that the commodity for which he seeks authorization is 
not a;t that time being transported by a protesting com-
mon carrier for the shipper for whom he proposes to 
transport. Such a holding will restrict the common car-
riers of this State to the commodities and volume of 
traffic they are transpo:rlting as of the date of this opin-
ion. As a practical matter the flow of traffic to and from 
any common carrier is in a constant state of flux. Ship-
pers, for one reason or another, may cease the use of 
common carriers or have no further need for their serv-
ices, yeJt at the same time other shippers may commence 
the use of such transportation service. If the theory of 
motor carrier regulation is to be logically followed, it 
must adhere to the concept that an existing carrier shall 
be permiJtted to transport commodities for the shipping 
public where it has the facilities and the express willing-
ness and ability to do so. The mere fact that a contract 
carrier may, by virtue of its limited operations, be able 
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to initially tender service at a slightly reduced rate has 
uniformly been rejected as the basis upon which a grant 
of authority might be allowed. The reasons for such con-
cept are obvious. As of the date of any hearing on an 
application for contract carrier aulthority, the parties 
have presumably entered into a contract providing, 
among other things, for the rate which will be charged 
for the transportation service. This is, however, nothing 
more than a proposal, and such raltes are subject to ad-
justment at any time in the event that they prove inade-
quate. The granting of a contract carrier permit is not 
one necessarily authorizing service under the peculiar 
circumstances which exist at the moment of its issuance, 
but is a continuing authorization subject to change dur-
ing future operations under its terms. 
In the instant case the shipper has attempted to 
support the application upon the premise that it will 
utilize its own trucks in the transportation movement un-
less the author~ty is granted, and the argument is then 
advanced that this can have no real effect upon protest-
ing common carriers. The intent of any shipper witness 
today, the length to which he may go in testimony of this 
type, constitutes no obligation as to the method of trans-
portation in the future. The decision in this case is 
extremely dangerous in its concept that the mere threat 
of a shipper to utilize his own equip1nent if the contract 
carrier authority is not granted, is sufficient to justify 
a grant of authority. If this case were considered as an 
isolated instance, the economic impact on the plaintiff 
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rule of this case is accepted as sound regulatory practice, 
it will open the door :to a flood of cases based upon the 
above concept. There would appear no limit to the grants 
of contract carrier permits which may be issued. This 
traffic moves primarily in truckload lots and is clearly 
the most desirable :traffic. Such a diversion, if allowed 
to expand, will mean that the common carriers who are by 
law compelled to transport any commodities tendered to 
them by the shipping public, will find themselves in a 
declining economic situation which can only result in 
a substantial reduction in service offered to the public 
or total cessation of common carrier service. In a State 
such as Utah wherein substantial areas are served exclu-
sively by truck, and rail facilities are not available, the 
detriment to the shipping public is obvious. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission has for many 
years administered the Interstate Commerce Act in which 
is found a declaration of the National Transportation 
Policy. The basic concept of utility regulation as em-
bodied in such Act is essentially the same as that found 
in the statutes and in the decisions interpreting the same 
in the various states, including Utah. While it is recog-
nized that the decisions of such Commission are not bind-
ing upon this court, it is nevertheless believed that in 
view of the extensive experience of the Commission and 
its specialization in this particular field its decisions 
should be of substantial persuasive force. Such Com-
mission has freq·uently had occasion to consider cases 
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factually similar to the case before the court, and has 
held that the mere fact that the protesting common car-
rier is not at the time of application transporting com-
modity for the shipper involved cannot sustain a grant 
of contract carrier authority. Rather, the Commission 
has held that such traffic must be first tendered to the 
common carrier to determine whether or not the services 
rendered by it are adequate. The decided cases of the 
Commission are numerous and consistent, and a few will 
suffice to show the regulatory concepts. 
The case of Arthur B. Jarrell-Norfolk, Virginia; 
No. BC 19917 (Sub. No. 1) ; 11 FCC 33, 615, involved a 
situation similar to that in the instant case. The shipper 
had not utilized the available facilities of protestant com-
mon carrier and was supporting the contract application. 
In denying the application, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission said: 
"·The evidence establishes that there is avail-
able motor common carrier service from Pitts-
burgh to Norfolk which has not been used or 
otherwise shown to be inadequate in any material 
respect. * * * we would not be fostering a sound 
transportation system by refusing to allow an 
existing carrier to obtain additional traffic." 
Again in Monterrey Freight Forwarding Corpora-
tion Contract Carrier .Application; No. MC 115437; 12 
F·CC 33, 757, where as in this ease, the shipper ·had used 
proprietary equipment rather than ship with the avail-
able common carriers, the Commission denied the con-
tract application and said: 
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"As seen, the record clearly indicates that an 
abundance of service is available to meet the 
needs of the sole supporting witness. Instead of 
using these services, the supporting witness has 
turned to the operation of proprietary equipment. 
It is our opinion that if afforded the opportunity 
the opposing carriers could and would provide 
adequate service to handle the traffic here in-
volved." 
Citing again from the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
in C & E Trucking Corporation, Extension-Whole Con-
densed Milk; No. MC 111435 (Sub. No. 13); 12 FCC 34, 
024, where the protestant motor common carrier was not 
transporting the milk involved, the Commission denied 
the contract application and said: 
"Since we have found that protestants hold 
appropriate authority, and since no deficiency or 
disability has been shown in their service, we be-
lieve that they should be afforded an opportunity 
to transport the considered traffic before a new 
service is authorized in competition with them." 
Many other cases could be cited supporting this well 
established principle of law. It is inherent in the concept 
of regulation of the motor carrier industry that the re-
quirement that a carrier provide adequate service con-
templates that the shipping public must use such serv-
ice so long as it is adequate and that a single shipper 
cannot obtain for himself additional services because he 
does not choose to use that provided. Monopolistic rights 
are granted and rates regulated by the State on the pre-
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mise that the carriers granted these rights will be pro-
tected in their exercise of them. The motor carrier in-
dustry does not purport to operate under a theory of 
completely independent competition. Protestant herein 
has expended considerable sums of money in equipping 
itself to meet the needs of the entire shipping public in 
the area in which it is authorized to serve. It has sup-
plied services which are fully adequate to meet the needs 
of the shipper here involved. That the shipper may be 
dissatisfied with the rates offered is a matter which he 
should take up with the Public Service Commission, the 
rate regulating body of the State. This is the remedy 
the law has established for such complaints. 
A stable transportation system is an important re-
quisite to a sound economy of this State. The rule of 
this case can only promote confusion and strife in the 
transportation industry in Utah. Common carriers will 
be deprived of a sound policy of regulation which has 
allowed them to provide at great expense the facilities 
and service now available to the public. Such a rule will 
needlessly stunt the growth of the common carrier in-
dustry and will induce 1nany speculative and unwarranted 
entries into the contract carrier field. 
While the amount of traffic at issue in this particu-
lar case is insignificant in the transportation picture of 
the entire State, the i1nplications of the rule of the case 
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extend far beyond the interests of the parties hereto. 
Such a decision should not be permitted to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that this Court should 
reconsider this case in light of the unprecedented rule 
of law which, without citation or authority, was dropped, 
off hand, into the decision. Such a rule is completely 
contrary to the general rule of law and the rule which has 
pertained in Utah from the inception of motor carrier 
decisions and legislation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN F. PIERCEY and 
WOOD R. WORLSLEY, and 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
